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But the real question for me is: How am I defined? 
Who is it that is favoured? But may I lift up my 
mind to indicate who it is? (Wittgenstein, 1989, p. 
27) 
 
The words used are to some extent to be ‘explained’ 
by the ‘context’ in which they are designed to be or 
have actually been spoken in a linguistic 




We propose to define a psychological hypothesis for the word “me” that designates, for each 
human being, his or her personal interior Ego. Every human being is naturally an Ego – it 
is a question of learning the particular linguistic sound (or the particular sign gesture in a 
sign language) in which it is named in one’s mother tongue. In fact, it is not important, for 
our analysis, that the Ego be innate or developed gradually through experience. The 
important point in the psychological hypothesis is that the Ego is an entity (psychological 
and internal, to be exact) of one kind, while the word “me” is an entity of a different kind. 
The second hypothesis, which we will call the externalist hypothesis, responds affirmatively 
to question a), and maintains that “me” indicates a certain individual body, that of the 
person who is using the word “me”. A possible advantage of this last hypothesis is that in it 
one is not obliged to admit the existence of presumed and invisible psychological states. In 
this case also, however, the word “me” is separated from that which is referred to. 
 
 
1. A little girl, for the first time in her life, says “me”. “Who is the prettiest 
little girl in this house?” her mother has asked the child while washing her. It 
was not exactly a question, but the child has understood it as such and has 
proudly answered “me”. In this essay, we shall attempt to confront the 
problem of the meaning of this word. We will begin from two of the senses in 
which the question can be understood: a) does “me” refer to something? b) is 
the child, when she says “me” thinking of something in particular? Let us try 
to be exact here about the question in hand. One could reply to the question 
b) affirmatively: “me” designates an internal psychological state, a sort of 
concept (innate, for example), that the little girl has learned at a certain point 
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to associate with the linguistic sound “me” in use in the community into 
which she was born. We propose to define this solution as the psychological 
hypothesis. In this setting, the word “me” designates, for each human being, 
his or her personal interior Ego. Every human being is naturally an Ego – it is 
a question of learning the particular linguistic sound (or the particular sign 
gesture in a sign language) in which it is named in one’s mother tongue. In 
fact, it is not important, for our analysis, that the Ego be innate or developed 
gradually through experience. The important point in the psychological 
hypothesis is that the Ego is an entity (psychological and internal, to be 
exact) of one kind, while the word “me” is an entity of a different kind. The 
second hypothesis, which we will call the externalist hypothesis, responds 
affirmatively to question a), and maintains that “me” indicates a certain 
individual body, that of the person who is using the word “me”. A possible 
advantage of this last hypothesis is that in it one is not obliged to admit the 
existence of presumed and invisible psychological states. In this case also, 
however, the word “me” is separated from that which is referred to.  
Later in this work, we will seek to show that neither the psychological nor 
the externalist hypotheses are satisfactory, precisely because they consider the 
word “me”, which, moreover, is one of the few linguistic universals to be 
unanimously recognised (Beneveniste, 1966) as a description of something else, 
the Ego or the individual body.  
 
 
2. Let us begin with the psychological hypothesis: the Ego exists 
independently of the word “me” which designates it, both in a logical sense 
(according to this hypothesis Ego and “me” are separate entities, and the 
latter presupposes the former) and a temporal one (first I notice that I am an 
Ego, and then the need can come to communicate this to the external world). 
Let us return to the example of the little girl, who for the first time in her life 
says distinctly “me” (it could be, in effect, that before this public use, the little 
girl had begun to use this word sotto voce). For example, it could happen that, 
during a game, she suddenly noticed that it is precisely she who is playing, and 
from this mature –for our analysis it is not of consequence that this occurs 
abruptly or gradually – the awareness of being an Ego. The little girl identifies 
in herself a certain psychological state, for example, state X, and subsequently 
understands that X = Ego. Here, there is a serious logical problem (cfr. Heal, 
2002): could the little girl be making a mistake? Could it in effect be that X is 
not equal to Ego? This is the problem that Wittgenstein deals with in his 
Philosophical Investigations in the chapters dedicated to the possibility of a 
private language. A private language is one which only one person in the 
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world can use and understand, just as the little girl and no one else can accede 
to her Ego. If a private language can exist, a private awareness of one’s 
internal states can do also: “Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep 
a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it 
with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I 
have the sensation.― I first want to remark that a definition of the sign 
cannot be formulated. ― But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive 
definition. ― How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. 
But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my 
attention on the sensation ― and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. ― But 
what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely 
serves to establish the meaning of a sign. ― Well, that is done precisely by the 
concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the 
connexion between the sign and the sensation. ― But “I impress it on myself” 
can only mean: this procedure brings it about that I remember the connexion 
right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. 
One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that 
only means that we can’t talk about ‘right’.” (Philosophical Investigations, I, § 
258) 
The situation of the little girl is similar to that presented in Wittgenstein’s 
mental experiment. At first, the little girl identifies the internal state X., and 
then she recognises it as her Ego. In the same fashion, the private sensation 
manifests itself first and it is then recognised and named with the sign “S”. 
Yet since both processes are private and hidden, “whatever is going to seem 
right to me is right”, with the disastrous consequence, “that only means that 
we can’t talk about ‘right’”. The psychological hypothesis presupposes a 
fundamental asymmetry between the awareness the little girl may have of her 
Ego and that which everyone else may have. While she cannot be mistaken, 
the others can at most make hypotheses about her Ego. Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, shows us that the little girl and the others are in the same 
situation. There is awareness if there is the possibility of distinguishing 
between a correct awareness and a mistaken one. In the case of the private 
awareness of one’s Ego, it is not possible to distinguish between correct 
awareness and mistaken awareness. Therefore private awareness is not a form 
of awareness.  
If private awareness is excluded, then the psychological hypothesis should 
be abandoned. When the little girl says “me” it is not at all certain that her 
Ego is being referred to, because not even she has a reliable way of acceding to 
her internal states. The child, compared to her presumed Ego, finds herself in 
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the same situation in which the people with whom she talks do. The 
psychological hypothesis presupposes the internal certainty of one’s Ego and 
not of some other entity. Yet without this internal guarantee, the entire 
psychological hypothesis loses all interest. The psychological hypothesis does 
not respond, therefore, to our problem: who is the girl speaking of when she 
says “me” to her mother?  
 
 
3. How can we describe our initial example from the point of view of the 
externalist hypothesis? The little girl says “me” because she has learned that 
when she wishes to refer to her own body, she has to use this word. There is an 
observation which must be made immediately, however. This usage of the 
word “me” is highly particular. It can be useful only when there is the 
possibility of confusion between two bodies contemporaneously present. In 
this case “me” would serve as a sort of distinguishing sign, while perhaps the 
little girl, when she says “me”, intends something which is more complex. One 
could use “me”, in effect, when one is alone, when there should be no risk of 
confusion: “One can talk to oneself. ― If a person speaks when no one else is 
present, does that mean he is speaking to himself?” (Philosophical 
Investigations, I, § 260). Why should a person who is alone talk to him/her 
self? Let us put the case that this person uses the word “me”. In this case 
there are no doubts regarding what bodies are present, and therefore why use 
the word “me”. Perhaps there is a use of “me” which is different from that of 
a simple sign of differentiation. There is also an even greater difficulty. The 
little girl says “me” intending her own individual body, but the mother could 
also say “me”, so which is the body that corresponds to “me”? Whoever has a 
body can, according to this hypothesis, say “me”, just as every fork is called 
“fork”. The externalist hypothesis is too radical, and in order to avoid the 
presupposition of any psychological entity, it becomes unrealistic, because it 
now becomes difficult even to imagine how the child could have learned to 
associate her own body with the word “me”.  
 
4. Neither the psychological nor the externalist hypotheses seem to be capable 
of identifying the problems that we have posed: what does the word “me” 
mean? “Me” does not seem to refer either to the body of the person speaking 
nor to the private and presumed interior state of the speaker. In, effect, as 
Benveniste notes, “me” together with other words like “here”, “now” and 
others again: “se distinguent de toutes les désignations que la langue articule, 
en ceci: ils ne renvoient ni à un concept ni à un individu. Il n’y a pas de concept 
“je” englobant tous les je qui s’énoncent à tout instant dans le bouches de tous 
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les locuteurs, au sens où il y a un concept “arbre” auquel se ramènent tous les 
emplois individuels de arbre. Le “je” ne dénomme donc aucune entité lexicale. 
Peut-on dire alors que je se réfère à un individu particulier? Si cela était, ce 
serait une contradiction permanente admise dans le langage, et l’anarchie dans 
la pratique: comment la même terme pourrait-il se rapporter indifféremment à 
n’importe quel individu et en même temps l’identifier dans sa particularité? 
On est en présence d’une classe de mots, les “pronoms personnels”, qui 
échappent au statut de tous les autres signes du langage. A quoi donc je se 
réfère-t-il? A quelque chose de très singulier, qui est exclusivement 
linguistique: je se réfère à l’acte de discours individuel où il est prononcé, et il 
en désigne le locuteur. C’est un terme qui ne peut être identifié que dans […] 
une instance de discours, et qui n’a de référence qu’actuelle. La réalité à la 
quelle il renvoie est la réalité du discours. C’est dans l’instance de discours où 
je désigne le locuteur que celui-ci s’énonce comme “sujet”. Il est donc vrai à la 
lettre que le fondement de la subjectivité est dans l’exercice de la langue. Si 
l’on veut bien y réfléchir, on verra qu’il n’y a pas d’autre témoignage objectif 
de l’identité du sujet que celui qu’il donne ainsi lui-même sur lui- même.” 
(Benveniste, 1966, pp. 261-262). 
Benveniste proposes a solution which is alternative to both the 
psychological and externalist hypotheses. When the little girl in our example 
says “me”, she is referring neither to a private internal state of her own nor to 
her body to distinguish it from that of her mother: “me” “se réfère à l’acte de 
discours individuel où il est prononcé”. Saying “me” attests that a) the 
position of speaker has been assumed, b) that one is capable of doing so. 
Initially, the reality of “me” is therefore a completely linguistic one. The 
psychological validity of “me” is secondary compared to its linguistic validity. 
“Me” refers to the fact that, in the situation in which “me” appears, a body is 
saying “me”: “la “subjectivité” […] est la capacité du locuteur à se poser 
comme “sujet”. Elle se définit, non par le sentiment que chacune éprouve 
d’être lui-même (ce sentiment, dans la mesure où l’on peut en faire état, n’est 
qu’un reflet), mais comme l’unité psychique qui transcende la totalité des 
expériences vécues qu’elle assemble, et qui assure la permanence de la 
conscience. Or […] cette “subjectivité” […] n’est que l’émergence dans l’être 
d’une propriété fondamentale du langage. Est “ego” qui dit “ego”. Nous 
trouvons là le fondement de la “subjectivité”“ (Ivi, pp. 259-260).  
With regard to the externalist hypothesis, it should be noted that for 
Benveniste, “me” does not designate the body of the speaker, but rather the 
fact that that body is speaking, and in particular it is saying “me”. “‘Me’ is 
therefore a linguistic entity ‘sui-référentiel’. ” (Ivi, p. 263) 
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There are three principal characteristics to Benveniste’s hypothesis: a) it 
does not presuppose any private psychological entity, thus avoiding 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of private language; b) it starts from a fundamental 
public fact, someone who says “me”; c) from the outset, it underlines the social 
character of me because “la conscience de soi n’est possibile que si elle 
s’éprouve par contraste. Je n’emploie je qu’en m’adressant à quelqu’un, qui 
sera dans mon allocution un tu. C’est cette condition de dialogue qui est 
constitutive de la personne, car elle implique en réciprocité que je deviens tu 
dans l’allocution de celui qui à son tour se désigne par je” (Ivi, p. 260. In 
effect, the little girl says “me” responding to the mother : at first she is the 
“you” to whom the “me” of the mother speaks. When the child then responds, 
she becomes a “me” and the mother a “you”. Before being a psychological 
entity “me” is an enunciative function which always presupposes a “you” as 
addressee : "le langage n’est possibile que parce que chaque locuteur se pose 
comme sujet, en renvoyant à lui-même comme je dans son discours. De ce fait, 
je pose une autre personne, celle qui, tout extérieure qu’elle est à “moi”, 
devient mon écho auquel je dis tu et qui me dit tu. ” (Ibidem).  
Let us return once more to the little girl who says “me”.According to 
Beveniste, in this case “me” signifies that, for the first time, the child gathers 
a link between her mother’s word and the words that she could pronounce. 
The mother’s words are not just orders, prohibitions, permissions or verbal 
caresses, but can also be questions, to which response can be made. While with 
an order there is only someone who speaks and someone who must obey, and 
therefore in effect only an enunciative function which is not reversible, in a 
question there are two enunciative functions which are exchangeable. In 
saying “me”, the child recognizes that she also can be a “me”, and therefore 
that also the mother can become a “you”: “cette polarité ne signifie pas égalité 
ni symétrie: “ego” a toujours une position de trascendance à l’égard de tu; 
néanmoins, aucun des deux termes ne se conçoit sans l’autre; ils sont 
complémentaires, mais selon une opposition “intérieur/extérieur”, et en même 
temps il sont réversibles” (Ibidem). 
There is one last point, however, which needs to be clarified, so as to be 
able to abandon definitively the psychological hypothesis regarding the 
meaning of “me”. According to Benveniste, “me” is first an enuciative 
function which presupposes a “you” to be addressed which then in its turn 
may become a new “me” and vice versa. The strong element in the 
psychological hypothesis is that in some fashion it satisfies the requirement of 
explaining how it is that we believe that every time we say “me” it is always 
the same me that says it. To satisfy this requirement, which has evident ethical 
consequences, the psychological hypothesis presumes the existence of a primal 
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Ego, which would be the base for all linguistic acts in which “me” appears. Is 
there a way to safeguard this requirement of continuity in time of “me” 
(Glock, Hacker, 1996, p. 105) without having the obligation of admitting the 
existence of an entity which is mysterious and radically private like the 
psychological Ego?  
 
 
5. There is a point which brings together both the psychological and 
externalist hypotheses: both consider the word “me” as a description of 
something else. For the first it is the Ego and for the second the body of the 
speaker. The original aspect of Benveniste’s hypothesis, on the other hand, is 
that the word “me” is not a description. When the little girl says “me” to her 
mother, she is not describing something. In reality “me” signifies that the 
person speaking is a me: the little girl is a me because she says “me”. “Me” does 
not describe a fact distinct from the word that indicates it. The fact – being a 
me – here coincides with saying “me”. In this case, “the uttering of the 
sentence is […] the doing of an action” (Austin, 1962, p. 5): “me” is a 
performative. The word “me” used in appropriate circumstances, does not 
describe a pre-existent Ego, nor does it indicate the body of the speaker. It 
constitutes the subjectivity of the speaker. It is the living body of me. The 
child discovers that she is a me because she learns to use the word “me”. To 
use Austin’s terminology, the locutional act “me” has, as a self-referential 
perlocutionary effect, the constitution of “me” for the person who materially 
utters that same “me”. That is, the use of the performative “me” is a happy 
one if by this means the “me” is constructed. There are at least two conditions 
which confer a “‘happy’ functioning” (Ivi, p. 14) of the performative “me” 
(cfr. Glock, Hacker, 1996): a body which effectively says “me”; b) 
furthermore, “it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words 
are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very 
commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should 
also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or 
even acts of uttering further words” (Austin, 1962, p. 8). Let us consider the 
first condition: there can be a me if there is a material body capable of uttering 
“me”. The eventual existence of an Ego as a private mental state is 
subordinate to the capacity to say “me”. Benveniste’s hypothesis is strongly 
materialist and admits the possibility of mental states only as a consequence 
of the capacity to realise linguistic acts. Yet a material body which says “me” 
is not sufficient. Even an automatic food distributor with an incorporated 
loudspeaker can say “me”, for example, but that is not sufficient for it to be 
considered a real me. The condition of there being a body capable of using the 
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word “me” in a competent manner is necessary, but it is not sufficient for 
there to be a me. Let us return to the little girl. The mother is speaking to her. 
She asks her something, the little girl responds “me” and the mother smiles in 
contentment. In this case the use of “me” becomes part of a “conventional 
procedure” (Ivi, p. 14) which is quite structured, in an exchange of 
enunciative roles between mother and daughter, that is, between “me” and 
“you”. The smile of the mother in coincidence with the word “me” from the 
daughter is the answer that confirms and fully realizes the performative “me”: 
in effect, “the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
and completely” (Ivi, p. 15). The peculiar characteristic of the performative 
“me” is that it presupposes the performative “you”, and vice versa: “ainsi 
tombent les vielles antinomies du “moi” et de l’ “autre”, de l’individu et de la 
société. Dualité qu’il est illégitime et erroné de réduire à un seul terme originel, 
que ce terme unique soit le “moi”, qui devrait être installé dans sa propre 
conscience pour s’ouvrir alors à celle du “prochain”, ou qu’il soit au contraire 
la société, qui préexisterait comme totalité à l’individu et d’où celui-ci ne se 
serait dégagé qu’à mesure qu’il acquérait la conscience de soi. C’est dans une 
réalité dialectique englobant les deux termes et les définissant par relation 
mutuelle qu’on découvre le fondement linguistique de la subjectivité.” 
(Benveniste, 1966, p. 260) 
It is not sufficient for a material body to produce the word “me” for this 
performative to be a happy one. It is necessary that “me” be recognised as me 
by a “you”. More than other performatives, “me” realizes and presupposes a 
social relationship regarding more than one speaker. The peculiar 
characteristic of performatives, moreover, is that they imply consequences 
that extend beyond the moment of the enunciation. It is just this that we 
were seeking, to explain the temporal continuity of “me”: “where, as often, the 
procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any 
participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must 
in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to 
conduct themselves, and further must actually so conduct subsequently” 
(Austin, 1962, p. 15). The fact that today the performative “me” has been 
used happily – in effect, the mother greeted it with a smile of pleasure and 
encouragement, implies that the little girl will probably use it tomorrow also. 
Correlatively, the next day, the mother also will expect the child to say “me” 
again. Every performative “me” used felicitously creates the conditions for 
this use to be repeated in the future. This means, as Benvensite states, that 
“me” is “sui-référentiel”. The temporal continuity of me coincides with the 
history of happy uses, that is, uses in which “me” is recognised by a “you”. 
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Each “me” proffered now makes a new appearance of “me” easier tomorrow. 
Naturally, this means also that when a performative “me” is not used 
felicitously, for example when there is no “you” to greet the first timid 
appearance of “me”, the continuity in time of “me” will be affected by this. 
(Cimatti, 2007). In this case also, Benveniste’s hypothesis requires a minimal 
recourse to psychological entities. The “me” of the little girl is not, properly 
speaking, a mental entity – it is not the mysterious Ego. We can compare the 
construction of me to the process of formation of a riverbed. When the first 
rivulet of water flows from its source and begins to descend, it does not yet 
have a path to follow. The course is created together with the flow of water. 
The fact that yesterday the water followed a certain course makes it easier, 
tomorrow, for it to follow the same path. Thus, simple successful use creates 
the conditions for its repetition.  
 
 
6. If “me” is the perlocutionary effect of repeated, and felicitous use of the 
performative “me”, then it is a question of a construct which forms itself over 
time. We can imagine a developing history of awareness where every single 
“me” is part of an overall “me” which encompasses the single cases of “me”, 
as if every felicitous use of “me” left a residue, which taken together 
constitutes “me”. To begin with, there is only a series of utterances of “me” 
which are disconnected one from the other, and which are repeated in different 
situations, as in the example of the mother and daughter. Progressively, “me” 
comes to the realization of being “me”: this, properly, is “me”. Thus one 
moves implicitly from an implicit use of the performative “me”, in which 
“there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person 
uttering” (Ivi, p. 60) to a situation in which “the ‘I’ who is doing the action 
does thus come essentially into the picture” (Ivi, p. 61). There is a passage 
from a situation in which, in the foreground, it is explicitly the action realized 
by means of the performative to one in which it is explicitly the “me” that 
carries out the action that is in the foreground. That which is at first implicit 
and compact in linguistic use is the historic-cognitive process which Austin 
calls “making explicit” (Ibidem). Austin and Benveniste offer us the essential 
elements for the development of a non psychological theory of “me”: 
“historically, from the point of view of the evolution of language, the explicit 
performative [ad esempio “io”] must be a later development than certain more 
primary utterances, many of which at least are already implicit performatives, 
which are included in most or many explicit performatives as parts of a whole. 
For example, ‘I will ...’ is earlier than ‘I promise that I will ...’. The plausible 
view [...] would be that in primitive languages it would not yet be clear, it 
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would not yet be possible to distinguish, which of various things that (using 
later distinctions) we might be doing we were in fact doing. For example ‘Bull’ 
or ‘Thunder’ in a primitive language of one-word utterances could be a 
warning, information, a prediction, &c. It is also a plausible view that 
explicitly distinguishing the different forces that this utterance might have is a 
later achievement of language, and a considerable one; primitive or primary 
forms of utterance will preserve the ‘ambiguity’ or ‘equivocation’ or 
‘vagueness’ of primitive language in this respect; they will not make explicit 
the precise force of the utterance. This may have its uses: but sophistication 
and development of social forms and procedures necessitate clarification. But 
note that this clarification is as much a creative act as a discovery or 
description! It as much a matter of making clear distinctions as of making 
already existent distinctions clear.” (Ivi, pp. 71-72) 
The little girl’s explicit and aware “me” is formed starting from the 
felicitous use of the performative “me”. The semantic problem posed by the 
meaning of the word “me” is in reality a pragmatic problem: “Worte sind 
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